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Abstract
In 2012, Singapore amended its Misuse of Drugs to give courts hearing capital drug trafficking
cases the discretion to replace the default death penalty with life imprisonment and caning,
provided that the accused person can show that he was merely a drug courier and the pro-
secution certifies that he had substantively assisted the authorities in disrupting drug trafficking
activities. The Singapore High Court and Court of Appeal have since made important pro-
nouncements on the 2012 amendments, but several challenges remain: first, whether the
privilege against self-incrimination has been further eroded; secondly, whether an accused
person can invoke the statutory relief of being a courier only at sentencing; thirdly, whether it
is appropriate to leave the certification decision solely to the prosecution; and finally, whether
guidelines as to when the death sentence is appropriate should have been prescribed. These
challenges ought to be given serious legislative or judicial consideration as the criminal justice
system in Singapore continues to evolve in response to changing public perceptions of due
process and crime control. The first three challenges, in particular, may have important
ramifications for potentially innocent accused persons as it is submitted that the law as it stands
may incentivise some of them to plead guilty from the outset to maximise their chances of
avoiding the death penalty. As there are still a number of jurisdictions that retain the mandatory
death penalty for drug trafficking offences, this article may also be of comparative interest,
especially since there appears to be a dearth of literature on the discretionary death penalty for
drug offences.
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Overview
Singapore has always taken a firm stance against drug trafficking.1 Between 1975 and 2012, drug traf-
ficking was an offence punishable by the mandatory death penalty, but one of the criticisms levelled
against this was that the majority of drug trafficking convictions only resulted in the hanging of low-
level operatives working for drug syndicates and had no deterrent effect against the kingpins who con-
trolled the syndicates.2 In 2012, Singapore’s Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA)3 was amended to reflect—on
one view at least—a ‘calibrated distinction between the different levels of accountability’ of different
levels of operatives in drug syndicates and to ‘temper and mitigate harsh laws with compassion’.4
This resulted in the introduction of s. 33B, which gives courts hearing capital drug trafficking cases
the sentencing alternative of life imprisonment and 15 strokes of the cane if two conditions are satisfied:
first, a person who is convicted of drug trafficking5 proves, on a balance of probabilities, that his invol-
vement in the offence was restricted to that of a courier;6 and secondly, the prosecutor agrees to certify to
the court that the said person had substantively assisted the Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) in disrupt-
ing trafficking activities within or outside Singapore.7 With respect to the latter condition, the decision
can only be challenged on the grounds of bad faith or malice, for which the convicted person bears the
burden of proof.8
Since the 2012 amendments, there has been a moratorium on drug-related executions in Singapore,9
the High Court has heard and decided more than a dozen s. 33B cases,10 and the Court of Appeal (the
1. This article builds on a case comment (Siyuan, 2014) and a follow-up paper presented at the 2014 International Conference on
Law, Order, and Criminal Justice on the same topic (Siyuan, 2015). It reflects the jurisprudential changes that have taken place
since the conclusion of those two pieces.
2. See Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 12 November 2012 (Edwin
Tong). Human rights and constitutional challenges against the legality of the mandatory death penalty regime have also failed
before the Singapore courts over the years: see generally Siyuan (2012, 2013). For the prevailing United Nations Human
Rights Council viewpoint on the effectiveness of the death penalty, see http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewsID¼50238#.VPwYiOEvexg.
3. Chapter 185, rev. ed. 2008.
4. Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 12 November 2012 (Edwin Tong).
Earlier that year, changes were also made to the Penal Code (chap. 224, rev. ed. 2008) to remove the mandatory death penalty
for certain types of culpable homicide offences: Changes to the Application of the Mandatory Death Penalty to Homicide
Offences, Singapore Parliament Reports, 9 July 2012 (Kasiviswanathan Shanmugam); Public Prosecutor v Kho Jabing
[2015] 2 SLR 112 at [3].
5. Sections 5 and 7 read with s. 33 of the MDA make it an offence for a person to traffic in controlled drugs, while the Second
Schedule stipulates if an offence carries the death penalty.
6. The actual words used in s. 33B are ‘transporting, sending or delivering a controlled drug’ and include offers to do so and any
act preparatory for such purposes. It was in Parliament that the term ‘drug courier’ was used to describe persons wishing to
avail themselves of s. 33B: Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 12
November 2012. ‘Courier’ was also used in the judgments that will be discussed in this article.
7. A convicted drug courier can also escape the death penalty under s. 33B(3) if (apart from proving that his involvement was
restricted to that of a courier) he can prove that he was suffering from such abnormality of mind that it substantially impaired
his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in relation to the offence. However, due to space constraints this relief will
not be discussed in this article.
8. MDA, s. 33(4). The standard of proof is also the balance of probabilities.
9. Pao-Keerthi (2014: 521); Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 1129 at [4]–[5].
10. This figure does not include decisions without written grounds. The decisions that include written grounds are: Public
Prosecutor v Abdul Haleem bin Abdul Karim [2013] 3 SLR 734 (which led to a quasi-appeal in the form of Muhammad
Ridzuan bin Md Ali v Public Prosecutor [2014] 3 SLR 721); Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan [2014] 1 SLR 336; Public
Prosecutor v Abdul Kahar bin Othman [2013] SGHC 222; Cheong Chun Yin v Attorney-General [2014] 3 SLR 1141 (a
judicial review against the certification decision); Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali v Attorney-General [2014] 4 SLR 773
(also a judicial review, and which appeal will be heard later in 2015); Public Prosecutor vMuhammad Farid bin Mohd Yusop
[2014] SGHC 125 (whether the certification process can be bypassed via an amendment of the charge); Public Prosecutor v
Mahesvaran a/l Sivalingam [2014] SGHC 182 (sentencing considerations as to whether death penalty is appropriate even after
certification); Public Prosecutor v Purushothaman a/l Subramaniam [2014] SGHC 231 (also a case on sentencing
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apex court in Singapore) has also clarified several important points of law following a recent Criminal
Reference filed by the Attorney-General’s Chambers.11 There is now a fairly substantial body of juris-
prudence worth taking stock of, and this article considers some of the problems that remain unresolved
even after the litigation and judicial pronouncements. Four specific challenges are identified—of which
the connections between all of them will become clearer in due course—and they will be discussed here
in the following sequence:
a. The first challenge pertains to the privilege against self-incrimination, and how it is shaped not just
by the MDA but by other legislation as well. If a person is found with illegal drugs, the MDA states
that he is presumed to have trafficked those drugs, and he is also presumed to have known the nature
of those drugs since they were in his possession. If the accused person chooses to keep quiet or with-
holds exculpatory information (upon being charged by the authorities for instance), various adverse
inferences may be drawn against him in court pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC).12
Could s. 33B of the MDA potentially further erode the right to presumption of innocence and pres-
surise accused persons—particularly innocent ones—into incriminating themselves, in the calcu-
lated hope of avoiding the death sentence? Considering too that accused persons can be lawfully
denied access to counsel for an indefinite period when they are first investigated, are they placed
in a position of undue vulnerability at a critical juncture of the criminal justice process that may
affect their decision making?
b. Secondly—and while this is closely related to the preceding point conceptually, it raises separate
practical questions—if an accused person had remained silent when charged or if his original
defence did not involve him admitting to being a courier or even having any knowledge of the drugs,
can he subsequently claim to be a courier after he has been convicted of drug trafficking so as to
avoid the death sentence? Moreover, will there be practical difficulties in receiving evidence at the
sentencing stage that may possibly contradict his evidence given before and/or during the trial, and
is a Newton hearing appropriate or even of any use in resolving these evidential difficulties? Indeed,
will the potential evidential contradictions (and the implications on the credibility of the accused
person) present yet another reason to plead guilty at the outset in the calculated hope of avoiding
the death sentence? From a more conceptual viewpoint, is it even possible, in good faith, to make
the claim that one was indeed a trafficker (but a courier) only at the sentencing stage, or is this a
permissible consequence of the accused person exercising his privilege against self-incrimination?
c. Thirdly, the prosecution already wields considerable power in the form of prosecutorial discretion,
which under long-standing Singapore case law is effectively impossible to successfully challenge in
the courts. One of the main justifications given for this is that the prosecution is best-placed to con-
sider all the evidence and operational considerations of the case before deciding on the prosecutorial
decision that is in the public’s interest. But is it prudent to further entrench this power by making the
considerations); Public Prosecutor v Prabagaran a/l Srivijayan [2014] SGHC 222; Public Prosecutor v Mohd Jeefrey bin
Jamil [2014] SGHC 255 (whether the Public Prosecutor can predetermine the question of whether the accused person is a
courier); Public Prosecutor v V Shanmugam a/l Veloo [2015] SGHC 33; Public Prosecutor v Siva a/l Sannasi [2015] SGHC
73; Public Prosecutor v Mohammed Fauziya [2015] SGHC 118; Public Prosecutor v Christeen d/o Jayamany [2015] SGHC
126; Public Prosecutor v Jafar Shatig bin Abdul Karim [2015] SGHC 189; Public Prosecutor v Yogaras Poongavanam [2015]
SGHC 193; Public Prosecutor v Muhammad bin Abdullah [2015] SGHC 231.
11. Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan [2014] 1 SLR 834. The Attorney-General is both principal advisor to the government and
controller of prosecutions. Generally, the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to answer questions of law in such references if the
questions presented are of public interest: Public Prosecutor v Teo Chu Ha [2014] 4 SLR 600 at [27]. In this case, the Public
Prosecutor had filed the reference after the High Court Judge had raised various evidential difficulties regarding s. 33B. The
Court of Appeal inQuek Hock Lye v Public Prosecutor [2015] 2 SLR 563 also handed down a decision that touched on s. 33B,
but the main issue there was about equal protection of the law and not the application of s. 33B.
12. Chapter 68, rev. ed. 2012. The CPC replaced its decades-old predecessor in 2011 and contains the bulk of criminal procedural
provisions.
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certification of a drug courier as having provided substantive assistance also a prosecutorial decision
that seems equally beyond judicial scrutiny? Further, is the requirement of substantive assistance too
onerous? All things considered, it may be better—particularly from evidential and criminal justice
perspectives—to have the question of substantive assistance answered before the charge is brought,
rather than after liability has been determined. This may even avoid some of the difficulties brought
about by the first two challenges mentioned above.
d. The final point—which is distinct from the previous three points, but a consequence of the redistri-
bution of discretionary power between the arms of government—is that neither the parliamentary
records nor s. 33B of the MDA provide any guidelines or sentencing considerations as to when the
death penalty is more appropriate than life imprisonment and caning and vice versa. Even assuming
this does not slowly but surely lead to a complete departure from the death penalty regime and defeat
parliamentary intent, a potential problem of achieving sentencing consistency arises, especially
since there is no precedent or comparative legislation as guidance, and there is also no equivalent
of a full-fledged sentencing council in Singapore. A discretionary death penalty regime may also
result in more protracted litigation, and this is only going to have a toll on persons charged with
capital drug trafficking offences.
The privilege against self-incrimination
The scope of the privilege
To understand how the privilege against self-incrimination features in the context of the MDA, it is nec-
essary to first understand how the privilege has been conceptualised and defined in Singapore.13 It is
generally accepted that the privilege against self-incrimination is part of the broader right of silence,
which, in turn, is part of the overarching right to presumption of innocence (Chan J, 2013: 679–680;
Dennis, 2013: 5-7; Ho, 2013: 826–827).14 The privilege against self-incrimination, together with the
right to counsel, are ‘fundamental rights’ that ‘serve the important function of protecting the fairness and
reliability of the process’ by which an accused person’s evidence upon his arrest is given to the inves-
tigating authorities (Ho, 2013: 826; see also Chenwi, 2006: 609–610). With respect to the privilege
against self-incrimination in particular, it exists to insure against inaccurate fact-finding (which is an
epistemic consideration) and to prevent, among others, an affront to individual dignity (which is a
non-epistemic consideration) (Choo, 2013: 2–10).15 While the privilege is potentially ‘incompatible
with the effective investigation and prosecution of crime’, if the accused person ‘is to be enlisted to help
the police and the prosecution, the law ought to ensure that this should only happen under conditions
which will protect the innocent from conviction and the accused from improper treatment’ (Hor,
1993: 37).
Under s. 22(2) of the CPC, a person who is being investigated by the police ‘shall be bound to state
truly what he knows of the facts and circumstances of the case, except that he need not say anything that
might expose him to a criminal charge’.16 This is the main statutory basis of the privilege against self-
incrimination17 for most criminal proceedings,18 and while the accused person is entitled not to provide
any inculpatory evidence, should he withhold any exculpatory evidence, an adverse inference may be
13. For a historical analysis on how the privilege came to be in the common law, see Macnair (1990).
14. See also Ashworth (2006: 243): ‘it may be assumed that [the presumption of innocence] is one of the least controversial rights.
Its scope and meaning are, however, eminently contestable’.
15. However, the Singapore courts have never quite accepted, explicitly at least, the rationale for the privilege in these terms.
16. In some other common law jurisdictions—such as New Zealand—the privilege refers to the non-compellability of a person, on
pain of criminal sanction, to provide any information that may increase the probability of his criminal prosecution.
17. Muhammad bin Kadar v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 1205 at [65]; Seah Hock Thiam v Public Prosecutor [2013] SGHC
136 at [2]. See also Marie (2012: 54–56).
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drawn against him later on.19 This notion of drawing adverse inferences is recognised not only in the
jurisprudence,20 but in other provisions in the CPC as well that pertain to different points in the criminal
justice process.
First, under s. 23(1), when an accused person is charged, he will be cautioned that ‘[i]f you keep quiet
now about any fact ormatter in your defence and you reveal this fact ormatter in your defence only at trial,
the judgemay be less likely to believe you’. Secondly, under s. 230(1), when an accused person is called to
give evidence in his defence in court, hewill be cautioned that ‘the court in decidingwhether you are guilty
or not, may draw such inferences as appear proper from your refusal to give evidence’.21 Finally, under s.
261(1), if evidence is given that the accused person upon being charged with an offence (or upon being
informed that he may be prosecuted) failed to mention any fact which he subsequently relies on in his
defence, being a fact which in the circumstances existing at the time he could reasonably have been
expected to mention, the court may draw such inferences as appear proper in determining whether the
accused person should be committed to trial, has a case to answer, or is guilty of the offence charged.22
The privilege against self-incrimination has arguably been eroded further by the common law. For
instance, the Court of Appeal has held that the privilege is neither a constitutional right nor a fundamental
principle of natural justice; further, the investigating authorities are not obligated to inform an accused
person that he has a privilege against self-incrimination if he is being investigated under s. 22 of the CPC,
and because of that, failing to inform him of this privilege does not render any statement taken under s. 22
inadmissible at trial.23 Notably, when the draft of the new CPC was debated in Parliament in 2009, the
proposal that there should be a legal requirement that the police inform an accused person whom they wish
to question under s. 22 of the CPC of his privilege against self-incrimination was not accepted (Ho, 2013:
834–835). It has been observed that this proposal ‘was far from radical and, if implemented, would
have merely brought [the] law in line with . . . international standards and practices’ (Ho, 2013: 835).
As mentioned, the strength of the privilege against self-incrimination ought to be considered in the
light of the contiguous right of the right to counsel.24 Although art. 9(3) of the Constitution of the Repub-
lic of Singapore (Constitution)25 states that where a person is arrested, ‘he shall be allowed to consult and
be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice’, the courts have clarified that there are at least two main
limits to this constitutional right (See also Siyuan and Wong, 2015: 296–298). First, as is the case with
the privilege against self-incrimination, the investigating authorities have no legal obligation to inform
18. It is possible for the privilege to be abrogated under other specific criminal laws. One example is the Prevention of Corruption
Act (chapter 241, rev. ed. 1993); see also Taw Cheng Kong v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 78 at [152].
19. However, see Choo (2013: 102): ‘exculpatory information may well be inextricably linked with self-incriminating
information’.
20. Chou Kooi Pang v Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 SLR(R) 205 at [30]; Kwek Seow Hock v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 157 at
[18].
21. As to whether an accused person is obligated to call a material party as a witness to testify in court, the Court of Appeal has
clarified in Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Farid bin Mohd Yusop [2015] 3 SLR 16 at [43]–[48] that generally, no adverse
inference should be drawn against the accused person if such a party is not called as a witness.
22. See also Ho (2013: 831–832): ‘While s. 261(1) of the [CPC] permits an adverse inference to be drawn against the accused from
his non-disclosure of material facts when invited to give a statement under s. 23, it is unclear that it permits an adverse
inference to be drawn from his non-disclosure during questioning under s. 22. Section 22 empowers the police to take
statements in the course of their investigation . . . it has become common practice . . . for investigating officers to continue to
take further statements from the accused under s. 22 after they have already charged him with an offence under s. 23. It seems
premature to charge a person when there is evidently still a need for further questioning’.
23. Public Prosecutor vMazlan bin Maidun [1992] 3 SLR(R) 968 at [15]–[19]. The latter proposition, however, has to be read in
light of a more recent Court of Appeal judgment inMuhammad bin Kadar, above n. 17 at [140]–[147]. See also Siyuan (2012a:
414–422; 2015a: 47–52).
24. In Yap Giau Beng Terence v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 SLR(R) 855, the High Court held (at [38]) that an accused person has
to outline the main aspects of his defence immediately upon being charged so that he cannot raise defences at trial which are
merely afterthoughts—saying that he had wished to consult a lawyer before saying anything first is no excuse. See also Ho
(2013: 844–845); Hor (2004: Pt IV).
25. Rev. ed. 1999.
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the accused person of this right.26 Secondly, the right does not arise immediately after arrest and is not
violated as long as it is given effect within a reasonable time after arrest so that investigations are not
impeded.27 Although what constitutes ‘reasonable’ will ultimately depend on the facts of each case, it
is possible to deny access to counsel for up to a few weeks (Siyuan and Tan, 2014). It has thus been
remarked that the right to counsel in Singapore is ‘starkly different’ from that in other common law jur-
isdictions as well as international standards and practices (Ho, 2013: 838).
The application of the privilege in the MDA context
What all of the above means is that a person who is arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking is particularly
vulnerable at a critical stage of the criminal justice process (that is, when his statements are being taken by
the authorities), and the decisions he has to make at that point—without the benefit of legal advice—will
have far-reaching consequences,28 ironically even more so than ever with the introduction of s. 33B of the
MDA.To illustrate, in theHighCourt decision ofPublic Prosecutor vChumTat Suan,29 the accused person
was convicted of trafficking diamorphine and s. 33B was triggered. As this was the first case resulting in a
written judgment on the application of s. 33B, the prosecutor and defence counsel in their further submis-
sions jointly proposed that, should the court find the accused person a courier, the trial should be adjourned
and a further statementwould be taken from the accused person so as to give himanopportunity to furnish as
much information as he can; the prosecutor would then decide if the accused person had substantively
assisted the CNB in disrupting drug trafficking activities in the region. However, the judge raised several
concerns about this proposal to bifurcate proceedings in such a manner, one of which was that:
[I]n order to make the claim that he was no more than a ‘courier’, the accused must first admit that he was
trafficking . . .Choosing not to admit this might subsequently preclude him from arguing that he was no more
than a ‘courier’ should the court convict him nonetheless . . .One response might be that the accused must
take a position and stick with it. But the onus is not on the accused to take positions . . . the onus is on the
Prosecution to prove its case as to why the accused should be so punished. This must especially be so when
the punishment . . . is the sentence of death.30
These concerns were actually raised in Parliament when the 2012 amendments were being debated.
A Member of Parliament asked if drug couriers ‘will be pressurised into incriminating themselves’31
from the outset in the calculated hope of avoiding the death penalty—considering too that apart from
being put in a bind if his defence in court is different from what he had said when he was charged, the
accused person also has to conduct himself in such a way that the prosecutor is inclined to grant him the
certificate of substantive assistance.32 Another Member of Parliament asked if s. 33B of the MDA
26. Rajeevan Edakalavan v Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 SLR(R) 10 at [21]; Sun Hongyu v Public Prosecutor [2005] 2 SLR(R) 750
at [34].
27. Public Prosecutor v Leong Siew Chor [2006] SGCA 38 at [9]; James Raj s/o Arokiasamy v Public Prosecutor [2014] 2 SLR
307 at [14].
28. See also Ho (2014: 267): ‘The greatest moment of need is the moment of greatest vulnerability. This is when the client is
arrested by the police and detained in a usually hostile environment. He is alone against a vastly more powerful adversary,
interrogated on matters the legal significance of which he may not be aware. To prevent the lawyer from gaining access to his
client so that he may advise him on the law and on his legal rights, in a situation where his liberty or even life may be at stake,
would appear to be a fundamental failure of criminal justice’.
29. [2014] 1 SLR 338.
30. Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan [2014] 1 SLR 340 at [6].
31. Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 12 November 2012 (Eugene Tan).
While a confession that is made involuntarily—for instance, under threat, inducement, promise, or oppression—will not be
admissible, a self-inflicted sense of fear will probably not result in the confession being rendered inadmissible. It is probable
the same conclusion will be arrived at even if the analysis is based on a judicial discretion to exclude evidence.
32. See also Chum Tat Suan, above n. 11 at [28].
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would, in effect, only apply ‘in cases where the accused admits or pleads guilty to a capital drug
charge’33 before claiming trial. In response, the Minister for Law said: ‘There is that risk [of self-incri-
mination] . . . [but] if the accused knows something, and has to decide between trying to run a false
defence that knows nothing, and telling the truth and assisting the CNB—I do not think Members will
argue against giving him an incentive to tell the truth, to help us, and to help himself’.34
In light of the judge’s comments in Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan, a Criminal Reference was
filed to the Court of Appeal.35 Although the prosecutor did not expressly frame any of the questions to be
answered along the lines of self-incrimination, it was clear that the Court of Appeal was aware of the
potential self-incrimination implications engendered by s. 33B of the MDA. For instance, Justice Chao
noted the response of the Minister for Law above in his judgment:
What is of significance is that the Minister could have stated, but did not, that the whole point of this new
regime was to make it mandatory for accused persons who were in truth couriers to incriminate themselves,
and that if they chose to run a defence at trial that was inconsistent with being a courier, they would not, under
any circumstances, be permitted later during sentencing to raise the point that they were only couriers. If that
was the objective, the Minister [would have said so] . . .But he did not.36
Justices Woo and Tay, in a joint opinion, echoed similar sentiments:
Before the recent amendments to the MDA, an accused person already had to elect whether or not to give
evidence and . . .whether or not to cooperate and come clean with the authorities by providing information.
If he did, he might persuade the Prosecution not to press a capital charge against him . . .The purpose of the
recent amendments to the MDA is to state formally that if he provides substantive assistance to the authorities
(if he is a courier) . . . the court may decide not to impose capital punishment. The accused person does not
have to avail himself of this opportunity. The purpose of the amendments is therefore to give him an incentive
to come clean.37
In other words, the entire Court of Appeal was united in the view that s. 33B did not affect the pri-
vilege against self-incrimination in any perceivable negative way: if an accused drug trafficker is truly
innocent and has nothing to hide, the change in the law would not prejudice him at all. But it is at this
juncture that it is apposite to turn to the various presumptions created by the MDA.38 Specifically, s. 18
states that a person who is caught with anything containing controlled drugs is presumed to have had
those drugs in his possession, and a person who is presumed to have drugs in his possession is presumed
to have known the nature of those drugs. Further, s. 17 states that a person who has in his possession
controlled drugs that exceed a certain quantity (different thresholds are prescribed for different drugs)
is presumed to have had those drugs for the purpose of trafficking. A consequence of these presumptions
is that a person caught with a large quantity of controlled drugs would typically claim that he had ‘no
knowledge of the existence of the controlled drugs or . . . no knowledge of the true nature of the contents
of the article that he was told to traffic’.39 And the reason for these presumptions is that too often it is the
33. Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 12 November 2012 (Sylvia Lim).
34. Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 November 2012 (Kasiviswanathan
Shanmugam).
35. Chum Tat Suan, above n. 11.
36. Ibid. at [37] (emphasis in original).
37. Ibid. at [80]–[81].
38. The standard of proof required to rebut these presumptions is the balance of probabilities, even though s. 107 of the Evidence
Act (chapter 97, rev. ed. 1997) (EA) only requires such a standard of proof if an accused person is relying on a defence (as
opposed to simply denying guilt). Singapore’s Evidence Act finds near-equivalents in many other jurisdictions, such as
Malaysia. Notably, Malaysia also retains the death penalty for drug trafficking offences and has similar presumptions built into
its trafficking legislation.
39. Chum Tat Suan, above n. 11 at [23]. See also Ashworth (2006: 267–269).
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case that persons caught with drugs on them simply deny knowledge of the drugs, and it becomes prac-
tically difficult for the prosecution to prove otherwise.40
The question, however, is not so much whether s. 33B of the MDA further weakens the privilege
against self-incrimination for accused drug traffickers in the general sense,41 but whether s. 33B—bear-
ing in mind the aforementioned presumptions in the MDA, the adverse inferences under the CPC that
may be drawn against the accused person if he keeps quiet, and the indefinite denial of the accused per-
son of access to counsel while investigations are still ongoing—potentially incentivises innocent accused
persons of taking the gamble of admitting to being a courier just so to avoid the death sentence.42 This
particular gap was not addressed in Parliament and has not been addressed by the case law thus far.
While it is true that s. 33B also requires the prosecutor to issue a certificate of substantive assistance
before the judge can exercise his discretion to hand down a sentence of life imprisonment and caning
in lieu of the death penalty—and it is also true that one can deny the charge and still be sentenced to
life imprisonment instead of death43—an accused person may admit to guilt at an early stage under the
assumption that an early plea of guilt is generally sufficient to lead to a less severe sentence or the pro-
secutor preferring a less severe charge.44 This leads us then to the next question: are there any evidential
complications if an accused person either remained silent when he was first charged or raised a defence
that had nothing to do with being a courier, but changes his defence after being convicted of the charge?
Running different defences at trial and at sentencing
Whether there can be a change in position
This was another key issue that confronted the High Court and Court of Appeal in Public Prosecutor v
Chum Tat Suan. The two courts differed in how they characterised the problem, however. The High
Court judge explained what he thought the dilemma to be:
I have already convicted the accused on the basis of findings of fact that I have made. But now I have to make
new findings on at least one question of fact for the purposes of sentencing, which is whether the accused was
no more than a ‘courier’. If I allow parties to introduce new evidence on this . . . there is the possibility of
evidence emerging that might undermine the findings of fact that I had earlier made in convicting the accu-
sed . . . if I do not allow the introduction of any new evidence . . . there is a possibility of prejudice to the
accused, in that he might have conducted his defence in such manner as to furnish no occasion for his
40. See also Public Prosecutor v Lim Boon Hiong [2010] 4 SLR 696 at [65]–[75].
41. Although it has been observed that the privilege against self-incrimination has been largely modified or abrogated in much of
the common law world (see Keane andMcKeown, 2012: 595), many of these jurisdictions do not have the death penalty and/or
the various evidential obstacles faced by the accused person as described in this article.
42. See also McConville (2007: 385): ‘an institutional system of plea bargaining undermines the commitment that prosecutors
have to strict standards regarding evidence sufficiency; turns the adversary system on its head to one in which the individual is
required (by his or her own counsel as well as the prosecutor) to choose between a series of options which are more or less
coercive . . . turns defence counsel into the handmaiden of the court; and places the innocent at risk’.
43. See for instance Public Prosecutor vMohammed Fauziya, above n. 10; Christeen d/o Jayamany, above n. 10. In the latter case,
one of the accused persons accepted that she had indeed transported certain goods, but denied ever knowing what they were.
However, it was also clear that her role was at most that of a courier, and so it is possible to deny knowledge and invoke the
courier relief during sentencing. What this article is primarily concerned with is a person who is completely innocent in the
first place.
44. See also Chan G (2013: 18); Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 12
November 2012 (Eugene Tan): ‘This proposed amendment means that the Public Prosecutor would have the prosecutorial
discretion of pressing the so-called non-capital ‘‘14.99 gram charge’’, with reference to heroin, or proceed on a capital charge
but with the issuance of a ‘‘Certificate of Cooperation’’. In the latter case, the courts will then have the discretion to sentence
the convicted drug trafficker . . . given that the prosecution routes have different penalties on conviction of an accused per-
son . . . it is hoped that there will be a principled approach towards the preferment of charges so as to enhance public confi-
dence in our administration of justice’.
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evidence of his being more than a ‘courier’ to emerge at trial. This would make it . . . impossible for him now
to prove, without introducing further evidence on the question, that he was no more than a ‘courier’.45
The judge went on to conclude that in any event, had there been a request for new evidence to be
adduced, he would not have been inclined to permit it.46 As for the Court of Appeal, it was not unan-
imous. Justice Chao was of the view that it was theoretically permissible for an accused person to claim
that he was a courier even if he was doing so for the first time only at the sentencing stage. He wrote:
[W]here the raising of the statutory relief of being a courier a trial would undermine his primary defence [of
not even knowing the existence of the article containing the drugs], an accused person would be acting rea-
sonably in not putting forth a submission that he was a courier. To say that the accused person should raise
this latter albeit inconsistent position at trial would place him in an invidious position . . . even though an
accused person may have claimed that he had no knowledge . . . it is not impossible that . . . [he could] qualify
to be a courier.47
Justices Woo and Tay, however, disagreed with Justice Chao:
There is no suggestion in the parliamentary debates that the amendments will result in changing the trial pro-
cess and give the accused person a chance to deliberately stifle evidence to gain an advantage and then to
speak the truth when that strategy fails. If he were allowed to do so, it may even be said that the court is con-
doning such a strategy which it should be discouraging instead.48
In other words, whereas Justice Chao thought that it was theoretically possible (however unlikely)49
to permit an accused person to claim to be a courier only at the sentencing stage, the High Court judge as
well as Justices Woo and Tay did not think so, albeit for different reasons and to different extents. With
regard to Justices Woo and Tay, they considered any such change in position would invariably be done in
bad faith and should not be accommodated. This was so even though Justice Chao had contrasted the
scenario where the accused person claimed he did not even know that he was carrying the article contain-
ing the drugs against two other scenarios: first, where the accused person knew of the article containing
the drugs but did not know there were drugs inside, and secondly where the accused person admitted to
drug trafficking but did not know he was trafficking controlled drugs.50
It is clear that in the latter two scenarios, ‘the fact of the accused person possibly being a courier in the
transaction would have been implicit and obvious’51 and therefore such a fact must be pleaded from the
outset as the maintenance of internal consistency is critical to the accused person’s credibility. What,
then, is the real objection to the accused person claiming he is a courier only at the sentencing stage
if he falls under the first scenario? As alluded to above, if he is innocent but the only plausible way
to escape the death sentence is to consciously make the false claim of being merely a courier from the
outset, he may very well find that to be a preferable option to maintaining silence or denying knowledge, or
to be seen as someone completely changing his position when convenient. The weight of the presumptions
45. Chum Tat Suan, above n. 30 at [5].
46. Ibid. at [7].
47. Chum Tat Suan, above n. 11 at [28] and [31] (emphasis in original).
48. Ibid. at [81].
49. At the same time, the first scenario (as described towards the end of the paragraph) is also not that inconceivable. Suppose a
couple shares a suitcase on their travels. Only one of them works for a drug syndicate, and on one particular trip he decides to
smuggle drugs using their suitcase. His partner does not check the suitcase at any point. When the couple is caught, the
trafficker does not exonerate his partner and they are jointly charged for drug trafficking, even though one of them is com-
pletely innocent (or perhaps over-trusting).
50. Chum Tat Suan, above n. 11 at [24]–[25]. Yet another permutation, which is a subset of the last, is that the accused person
admitted to drug trafficking (controlled drugs or otherwise), but relied on a misrepresentation to as to the actual quantity of
drugs.
51. Chum Tat Suan, above n. 11 at [26].
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created by the MDA, coupled with his denial of access to a lawyer while his statements are being taken,
could in a very real sense increase the odds of securing a false confession induced by the hope of avoiding
the death sentence. As for the High Court judge, his main concern was about resolving contradictions in the
evidence given; without saying as much, he must have been referring to the first scenario rather than the
latter two scenarios, presumably for the same reasons given by Justice Chao.52 While the High Court judge
did not suggest that it was possible to resolve such contradictions, the Court of Appeal considered the
appropriateness of using a Newton hearing for this purpose, and was again split on this issue.
Whether a Newton hearing is appropriate to resolve evidential contradictions
Justice Chao, in furtherance of his view that an accused person can plead the fact of being a courier only
at the sentencing stage in the first scenario, opined that a Newton hearing would be appropriate to resolve
any evidential contradictions if it was reasonable to do so:
[I]f the accused person upon conviction but before sentence wishes to adduce further evidence to show that he
was only a courier, he must satisfy the trial judge why the further evidence was not and could not be adduced
earlier at the trial leading to the conviction. Furthermore, whatever new evidence that is sought to be adduced
must not contradict the finding of the court that the accused person is guilty of the charge and must
only . . . show that he was just a courier in the transaction . . .The key question is what conditions warrant the
adduction of new evidence at the sentencing stage. A Newton hearing is, after all, an exception rather than the
norm . . . called for only if the court is satisfied that ‘it is necessary to do so in order to resolve a difficult ques-
tion of fact that is material to the court’s determination of the appropriate sentence . . . ’53
Justices Woo and Tay again disagreed with Justice Chao:
A Newton hearing . . . gives an accused person a chance to adduce evidence on a material fact for the purposes
of sentencing which he had no or insufficient opportunity to address earlier. It arises from a bona fide omis-
sion and not a deliberate one to stifle evidence to gain an advantage . . . it is at the discretion of the trial judge
whether or not to have a Newton hearing. Any suggestion that an accused person will be allowed to adduce
new evidence at the sentencing stage, because he believed he had a valid reason to deliberately withhold such
evidence . . . should be avoided.54
Regrettably, Justices Woo and Tay were again at cross-purposes with Justice Chao. Justice Chao’s
remarks were still confined to the first scenario and did not apply to the second and third scenarios, while
the remarks by Justices Woo and Tay were clearly more applicable, if not exclusively applicable, to the
second and third scenarios.55 In the first scenario, if the accused person truly did not know that he even
had the article containing the drugs to begin with, why would he be able to provide any evidence that he
was only a courier, whether at the investigation stage or at trial? Not being able to give such evidence
would not be manipulating the system or acting in bad faith, but the first scenario appeared to have been
completely out of the contemplation of Justices Woo and Tay, even though Justice Chao was clear in his
52. After the Criminal Reference was heard, the matter was remitted to the High Court. In Public Prosecutor v Chum Tat Suan
[2015] SGHC 151, the same High Court judge clarified (at [10]) that the accused ‘has to elect which his case is at the out-
set . . . he cannot try out one defence after another’ and the prosecution ‘must indicate at the outset . . .whether it will or will not
be granting the certificate of substantive assistance’. These remarks, however, will not apply to the first situation described by
Justice Chao.
53. Chum Tat Suan, above n. 11 at [42] and [50]–[51] (emphasis in original). It should also be noted that a Newton hearing ‘is a
criminal procedure evolved in response to jury trials in order to ensure that the sentencing court does not award a sentence
without having first decided upon and making precise the basis of the substantive facts which substantially affect the sen-
tencing and which are disputed’: Tan (2010: [20.12]).
54. Chum Tat Suan, above n. 11 at [82]–[83].
55. See also Ong (2014: 9).
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illustration of the three possible scenarios confronting the court. At the same time, however, Justice
Chao’s opinion that an innocent accused person (in that he did not even know about the article containing
the drugs) could theoretically succeed in availing himself of the relief under s. 33B is also not without
problems.
For a start, unlike what s. 33B requires (that it is for the accused person to prove he is a courier on a
balance of probabilities), it is generally accepted that in Newton hearings, the legal burden is on the pro-
secution to prove any disputed facts in question beyond a reasonable doubt.56 However, not only will it
be odd to ask the prosecution to produce evidence of the accused person not being a courier even when
this may not have been part of the prosecution’s case theory, it is open to the prosecution to rely on s. 108
of the Evidence Act, which states that ‘When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person,
the burden of proving that fact is upon him’.57 If this provision applies, and assuming the accused person
is indeed innocent, short of somehow manufacturing evidence that he is indeed a courier for a drug syn-
dicate, it is hard to see how he can ‘satisfy the trial judge why the further evidence was not and could not
be adduced earlier at the trial’. This presents yet another set of reasons why an innocent accused person
might find the option of pleading guilty at the outset a preferable one.
Moreover, it seems that if there is actually some doubt that the article containing the drugs even
belonged to the accused person at all, he should be discharged or even acquitted rather than be artificially
considered a courier for the sentencing stage. The issue of the appropriateness or effectiveness of a New-
ton hearing to resolve any evidential contradictions therefore does not arise even under the first scenario
envisaged by Justice Chao, in that such a hearing already presupposes that the conviction is beyond a
reasonable doubt and any newly adduced evidence only goes to sentencing (that is, as potential mitigat-
ing factors) and not liability (including the question of whether he was a courier or not).58 In this regard,
s. 258(5) of the CPC—which gives the court the discretion to receive any evidence that may affect the
sentence—also does not solve the problem because such evidence may only be received after the miti-
gation plea has been made.59
The difficulty with just acquitting an accused person who could plausibly fall under the first scenario,
of course, is that if any of the presumptions under the MDA are triggered, the Court of Appeal has
reiterated on numerous occasions that the standard of proof required to rebut them is the balance of
probabilities and not the mere casting of reasonable doubt.60 One may point out that an accused drug
trafficker was already burdened by these presumptions and this was the requisite standard of proof well
before the introduction of s. 33B, and to the extent that drug syndicates are unlikely to plant drugs on
random innocent travellers,61 perhaps this is just the state of affairs in Singapore: all suspected drug
56. Public Prosecutor v Azuar bin Ahamad [2014] SGHC 149 at [98]. It is possible for a ‘reverse Newton hearing’ to be con-
ducted, but the local jurisprudence on this is scarce: see, for instance, Law Society of Singapore v Choy Chee Yean [2010] 3
SLR 560.
57. See also Wong Leong Wei Edward v Acclaim Insurance Brokers Pte Ltd [2010] SGHC 352 at [29]–[30].
58. It should be noted, however, that Justice Chao did not think that the question of whether someone was a courier needed to be
fully resolved at the liability stage. He was of the view that a Newton hearing would only be clearly unnecessary in the first
scenario if, for instance: the accused person’s case in relation to being a courier is absurd or obviously untenable; where the
evidence sought to be adduced is irrelevant to establishing the accused person’s role as a courier; where the evidence sought to
be adduced relates directly to the conviction; and where the specific issue of the accused person’s role in transporting the drugs
was in issue at trial and evidence was already adduced on the issue: Chum Tat Suan, above n. 11 at [53]. The problem with this,
as mentioned, is that an innocent accused person would not be able to conjure up evidence of being a courier at the sentencing
stage.
59. There is also the argument that because an accused person’s defence in the drug trafficking context typically concerns his
mens rea while s. 33B concerns the actus reus, it is possible to plead the courier relief only at the sentencing stage (see Ong,
2014: 10). However, this presupposes that s. 33B is confined to the actus reus, which is not necessarily the case.
60. Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v Public Prosecutor [2011] 4 SLR 1156 at [22]–[24]; Dinesh Pillai a/l K Raja Retnam v
Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 903 at [18]–[21];Mervin Singh v Public Prosecutor [2013] SGCA 20 at [26]. As to the actual
type of mens rea required (actual knowledge, wilful blindness, and so forth), see Siyuan and Khng (2012).
61. Tan Kiam Peng v Public Prosecutor [2008] 1 SLR(R) 1 at [71]. See also Goodhart (1968: 386).
Siyuan 59
 by guest on December 31, 2015epj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
traffickers found in possession of illegal drugs face an uphill task of securing an acquittal, and this policy
position of a preference of crime control over a liberal conception of due process has been upheld by the
Singapore government and courts for decades.62
But it is precisely the harshness of the law that has prompted the Attorney-General’s Chambers to
generally proceed, in accordance with the broad powers bestowed upon them, only with capital charges
in the most serious of cases over the years, including drug trafficking cases (See also Amirthalingam,
2013: 52–56). The prosecutorial discretion to initiate, prefer and amend charges is exercised together
with a rather opaque process of plea bargaining and reception of representations from defence counsel,
with one commentator describing such a phenomenon as bypassing the judicial process and conferring
the status of adjudicators on prosecutors (Amirthalingam, 2013: 55; see also Pao-Keerthi, 2014: 529–
531). If this is the case, should prosecutors be given even more power over the fates of drug traffickers,
as has been achieved through s. 33B of the MDA—or, even if they are in effect given more power,
should such power be exercised before or after liability has been determined by the court?
The substantive assistance limb
Current judicial and executive harmony on prosecutorial discretion
The High Court in Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali v Attorney-General63 was of the view that there
was nothing wrong with the substantive assistance requirement found in s. 33B of the MDA. There, the
applicant and his co-accused had been found guilty of drug trafficking and the court declared them both
to be couriers for the purposes of s. 33B. However, the prosecutor only granted the co-accused the cer-
tificate of substantive assistance, even though both of them were involved in the very same criminal
transaction and both of them had supposedly given the same information to the CNB. The applicant filed
for judicial review, principally on the grounds of bad faith (which is provided for in s. 33B) and unequal
treatment under the law (which art. 12 of the Constitution protects against).64
The judge dismissed the application for the following reasons: first, the applicant failed to provide
any evidence that the prosecutor had deliberately or arbitrarily discriminated against him; secondly, the
applicant failed to provide any evidence that he provided the same information to the CNB; and thirdly,
the fact that the two accused persons were involved in the same criminal transaction was an irrelevant
factor for the certification decision, since the latter is based on the conduct of the accused person after
being arrested and not before he was arrested.65 The judge also made this important observation regard-
ing the importance of not compromising the operational effectiveness of either the Attorney-General’s
Chambers or the CNB:
[T]he determination of whether a person has substantively assisted the CNB involves a multi-faceted inquiry,
which may include a multitude of extra-legal factors, such as: the upstream and downstream effects of
any information provided . . . the operational value of any information provided to existing intelligence;
and . . . the veracity of any information provided when counterchecked against other intelligence sour-
ces . . .This is largely a value judgment which necessarily entails a certain degree of subjectivity . . . the court
should be careful not to substitute its own judgment for the [prosecutor’s] judgment. Realistically speaking,
the [prosecutor] is much better placed to assess the operational value of the assistance provided by the accu-
sed . . . If the [prosecutor] is made to justify his decision in court on every occasion where bare and
62. Tan Kiam Peng, above n. 61 at [75]. The usual reasons for adopting this position are that drugs fracture society by breaking up
families and creating vicious cycles of poverty and crime as a result of drug addiction. Further, Singapore is surrounded by
many drug-trafficking countries and is particularly vulnerable as a point of transit.
63. Above n. 10. An appeal was lodged to the Court of Appeal and the grounds of decision were only released just as this proof was
finalised. The appellate decision is briefly described at the end of this article.
64. Muhammad Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali, above n. 10 at [18]–[23] and [39].
65. Ibid. at [44]–[48].
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unsubstantiated allegations are made by accused persons, the operational effectiveness of the CNB will likely
be hampered.66
Remarkably, in the 10 of the 11 other cases thus far that have dealt with the question of certifying
substantive assistance, the prosecutor was not required to give any reasons at all to the court as to why
certification was granted or declined—the court simply accepted the decisions at face value (or at least
this was all that could be gleaned from the judgments); further, none of the challenges against the deci-
sions succeeded, and in at least one of the cases, the prosecutor was even given the liberty by the court to
make the separate decision as to whether the accused person qualified as a courier under s. 33B, which is
against the express words of the provision.67
Insofar as the Attorney-General has been repeatedly recognised as a constitutional co-equal to the
judiciary by the Court of Appeal in previous challenges against the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
(Siyuan, 2013: 2), the outcomes described above should not be too surprising. As a matter of constitu-
tional law, the office of the Attorney-General is expressly entrenched, and his prosecutorial powers are
also constitutionally confirmed in art. 35(8), which states that ‘The Attorney-General shall have power,
exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any offence’.68 This
starting point has since been developed into a set of subsidiary principles by the Court of Appeal in the
last few years to strengthen the near-unassailability of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.69
First, there should be no judicial interference with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, unless the
discretion has been exercised unlawfully (of which two obvious examples of unlawfulness would be bad
faith and bias). Secondly, the courts should proceed with the presumption that when the Attorney-
General exercises prosecutorial discretion, this is done so in accordance with the law. Thirdly, the
Attorney-General has full power to bring different charges against different offenders of the same crime
and even of the same transaction, unless this power is exercised arbitrarily by taking into account irre-
levant considerations (this would be a breach of the equality provision in the Constitution). Fourthly,
the legal burden is on the accused person challenging the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to adduce
prima facie evidence of an improper exercise of discretion, and unless this is done, the Attorney-
General has no obligation to furnish reasons for any prosecutorial decision made. Finally, even if it
is proved that the Attorney-General had acted unlawfully, the court’s power is limited to making a
declaration and does not extend to changing the outcome of a conviction.
Given these premises, it is not anomalous that there has never been any successful challenge against the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the Singapore courts. From the government point of view this is explain-
able, and the wide discretionary power justifiable. The overarching idea is that in Singapore, the government
has had a long-standing democratic mandate from the people to control crime in society—the communitarian
66. Ibid. at [50]–[51]. See also Cheong Chun Yin, above n. 10 at [32]: ‘How the CNB decides to conduct its investigations in each
case is not something which is within the purview of the courts . . . unless the Applicant can show bad faith or malice . . .The
Applicant is practically asking the court to adjudicate on the adequacy of the investigations and to speculate on what would
have happened if the CNB had done this or that. If the court accedes to this . . . the court will be making a jurisdictional error’.
67. Public Prosecutor v Abdul Haleem bin Abdul Karim [2013] 3 SLR 757 at [57] and [60]; Cheong Chun Yin, above n. 10 at [31]–
[33]; Prabagaran a/l Srivijayan, above n. 10 at [16]; Mohd Jeefrey bin Jamil, above n. 10 at [32]; V Shanmugam a/l Veloo,
above n. 10 at [21]–[25]; Quek Hock Lye, above n. 11 at [15]–[18]; Siva a/l Sannasi, above n. 10 at [26]; Public Prosecutor v
Christeen d/o Jayamany, above n. 10 at [45]–[47] and [89]; Public Prosecutor v Jafar Shatig bin Abdul Karim [2015] SGHC
189 at [12]. The exception was Public Prosecutor v Yogaras Poongavanam [2015] SGHC 193 at [25]–[31]. See also
Devendran a/l Supramaniam v Public Prosecutor [2015] SGCA 25 at [16]; Chum Tat Suan, above n. 11 at [8]–[10]; Public
Prosecutor v Muhammad bin Abdullah [2015] SGHC 231 at [35].
68. This power is also reflected in s. 11(1) of the CPC, which states that ‘The Attorney-General shall be the Public Prosecutor and
shall have the control and direction of criminal prosecutions and proceedings under this Code or any other written law’.
However, while only the Attorney-General can initiate and prefer charges, the court has the power (and exercises it occa-
sionally) to amend charges in the course of the trial (Siyuan, 2013: 5).
69. Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] 2 SLR 49, [24]–[45]; Yong Vui Kong, above n. 9 at [18]–[39]; Quek Hock
Lye v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 1012, [22]–[29].
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interest in this goal is paramount, with the collective good trumping any abstract notion of human rights.70
Strict laws and great executive powers are a necessary feature of this paradigm, without which the crime rates
would not be as low as they are—and in Singapore at least, drug trafficking is considered one of the greatest
menaces to society.71
Then there is also the assumption that the Attorney-General’s Chambers and the various police agen-
cies are not only extremely competent and professional, they are virtually corrupt-free as well.72 With
specific regard to the Attorney-General’s Chambers, the former Chief Prosecutor recently confirmed
that although no guidelines are publicly available (nor would they ever be made so in the near future),
every prosecuting decision is cleared by various levels of seniority within the organisation, and this
ensures sufficient internal consistency and accountability (Abdullah, 2013). Additionally, because the
prosecution has the greatest access to all of the evidence relevant to the case (including those that will
never be adduced in court), it is in the best position to make prosecutorial decisions that will be in the
best interests of the public, and no prosecution will ever be brought unless there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction (Abdullah, 2013). Be that as it may, is it appropriate to further entrench the discre-
tionary powers of the prosecution via the certification mechanism in s. 33B of the MDA?73
Proposals to scrutinise discretion and lower standard rejected in parliament
This was perhaps the most debated segment in Parliament when the 2012 MDA amendments were pro-
posed. The suggestions made by various Members of Parliament to redraft the substantive assistance
limb of s. 33B to ensure greater judicial scrutiny of the certification process—as well as for more mercy
to be shown to convicted drug couriers by lowering the standard of disposition for certification—were all
flatly rejected. As explained by the Deputy Prime Minister, the purpose of the substantive assistance
requirement in s. 33B is to ‘enhance the operational effectiveness of the CNB, by allowing investigators
to reach higher into the hierarchy of drug syndicates’ and to ‘send a deterrent message’ to drug syndi-
cates seeking to establish a foothold in Singapore—the discretionary death penalty regime is not meant
to signal any softening of the government’s stance as regards drug trafficking.74
The Minister for Law also reminded the House that there were many misconceived sympathies about
drug couriers in that many of them fully know ahead of time what they are doing is wrong and highly
detrimental to society, and that they are, at bottom, motivated by money more than anything else to com-
mit their crimes.75 The Court of Appeal, in the recent judgment of Public Prosecutor v Muhammad
Farid bin Mohd Yusop, has also noted that accused drug traffickers are increasingly relying in their
70. See Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 12 November 2012; Second
Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 November 2012. The current government
has been in power since 1959.
71. Ibid.
72. See Chan SK, ‘From Justice Model to Crime Control Model’, International Conference on Criminal Justice under Stress, 24
November 2006; Muhammad bin Kadar, above n. 17 at [58].
73. Another perspective, of course, is that the 2012 amendments to the MDAwere meant to reverse the arrogation of discretionary
power to the public prosecutor by giving the sentencing discretion to the judge, but as mentioned earlier the public prosecutor
still has very wide discretion in the eventual charge that is brought. See also Stuntz (2004: 2565): ‘In drug cases, the gov-
ernment often has another goal: to get information . . .Trading plea concessions for information means giving the biggest
breaks to the worst actors . . . In order to make their threats credible, prosecutors must punish defendants who fail to give them
the information they want . . .Perversities of this sort are bound to appear in a criminal justice system that casts prosecutors in
the role of lawmakers. No legislature would define a crime such that high-level conspirators have lesser liability than low-level
ones, but prosecutors are free to adopt such a ‘‘rule’’ in practice’.
74. Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 12 November 2012 (Teo Chee Hean).
In Singapore, the purposive approach to statutory interpretation trumps all other approaches: Interpretation Act (chapter 1, rev.
ed. 2002), s. 9A(1).
75. Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 November 2012 (Kasiviswanathan
Shanmugam).
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defences that they either did not know they had been asked to traffic a drug that would trigger the death
penalty, or that they did not know that they had been asked to traffic a drug of such quantity that would
trigger the death penalty.76
But what exactly were the suggestions made in Parliament that were rejected? Broadly divided, there
were four. First, drug couriers, being low-level operatives, are unlikely to be in a position to give any
substantive assistance to the requisite extent of disrupting drug trafficking activities in the region; how-
ever, it would be a perverse outcome if another trafficker, who is higher up in the hierarchy and can pro-
vide more useful information, escapes the death penalty.77 Secondly, it is possible that information or
assistance provided by drug couriers may not be immediately appreciated unless it is put together with
other pieces of information, obtained from other sources at other times;78 it is also possible that such
information or assistance may not be considered substantive because the information is outdated or the
authorities are incompetent.79 Thirdly, the MDA should provide some guidance as to what substantive
assistance entails, so that there will be greater certainty in the law.80 Finally, instead of substantive assis-
tance, the requirement could be that of full or good faith cooperation. The prosecution should provide the
reasons to the court if an accused person claims to have cooperated fully with the authorities but was
denied certification, and if there is concern about the sensitivity of operational information given, the
hearing could take place in camera and the records be sealed from the public.81
The first two suggestions were refuted on the basis that first, the starting point is not to consider how
to help convicted drug couriers avoid capital punishment, but how the MDA can be made even more
effective through the disruption of drug trafficking syndicates; there is no presumption that drug couriers
should be spared the death sentence just because they do not control drug syndicates.82 Secondly, given
that illicit drugs are not manufactured in Singapore but only trafficked through it, drug couriers can
indeed assume roles of importance in drug syndicates as they form the main link to the suppliers and
kingpins and are therefore in a position to supply valuable information to the authorities.83 The third
suggestion was refuted on the basis that if any guidelines are provided, the drug syndicates will be able
to prime the couriers with prefabricated sob stories so as to make them appear cooperative; what follows
then is the erosion of the deterrent value of the MDA as couriers escaping the death penalty would
become the norm.84 As for the last suggestion, it was refuted on the basis that the Attorney-General’s
Chambers is in a much better position than the courts to answer the question of substantive assistance
since it works closely with the various law enforcement agencies and has a good understanding of opera-
tional concerns; in any event, these concerns are also confidential and it will be in the interests of
national security not to subject the enforcement agents to any cross-examination and scrutiny in court,
even if proceedings were held in camera.85
76. [2015] 3 SLR 16 at [49]. See also Khor Soon Lee v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 201 at [29].
77. Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 12 November 2012 (Edwin Tong;
Sylvia Lim; Eugene Tan; Laurence Lien; Desmond Lee).
78. Ibid. (Edwin Tong; Faizah Jamal; Desmond Lee).
79. Ibid. (Sylvia Lim).
80. Ibid. (Alvin Yeo; Eugene Tan; Desmond Lee).
81. Ibid. (Sylvia Lim; Pritam Singh; Faizah Jamal). However, this was rebuffed by another Member of Parliament in the following
terms (see ibid. (Edwin Tong): ‘this can brook no argument because the alternative would be to subject the nature, type,
content and other details of the offender’s assistance to a public scrutiny in the court. That is unacceptable since it will severely
compromise our investigative powers and methods . . . the accused would likewise also not want details of his own assistance
to be publicised’.) See also ibid. (Christopher de Souza).
82. Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 November 2012 (Teo Chee Hean;
Kasiviswanathan Shanmugam).
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid. (Kasiviswanathan Shanmugam).
85. Ibid.
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The concept of substantive assistance is not completely unique to Singapore; this was stated so in Par-
liament aswellwhen the 2012MDAamendmentswere debated.86Referencewasmade to theUnitedStates,
forwhich under one of the general sentencing provisions of theUnited StatesCode, the courts can ‘impose a
sentencebelowa level established by statute as aminimumsentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another personwho has committed an offense’.87However,
the American position is materially distinct from s. 33B of the MDA and sheds little light on how the latter
can be interpreted, in that under the American position: there is no prosecutorial certification process
involved; the assistance is for the investigation or prosecution of another person generally and not for dis-
rupting drug trafficking networks, let alone drug trafficking offences; and the judicial discretion goes
beyond a binary choice of sentencingoptions.88Ultimately, the issue presentedby the substantive assistance
requirement in s. 33B (as well as the appropriate standard of disposition) goes back to any perceived lack of
separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive: to what extent should the prosecution be
involved in deciding what is essentially a question of sentencing? If the prosecution is already, in a sense,
predetermining the eventual fate of an accused drug trafficker through the initial charge that is brought, why
should it be involved again for the purposes of sentencing after liability has been determined by the court?
Might it not be simpler and less cumbersome for all parties involved to have the question of substan-
tive assistance answered before the trial, by framing it as a factor for determining the charge to be
brought, rather than as a post-liability sentencing consideration? In other words, if the prosecution has
deemed, before the trial, that the accused drug courier was cooperative enough, a potential death penalty
charge should not even be brought unless there are truly exceptional circumstances; conversely, if the
drug courier had simply not rendered any meaningful assistance, there will be less of a barrier for the
prosecution to bring a potential death penalty charge. This way, the court will not need to consider any
issue of proper or improper certification (which may involve operational and national security concerns),
and the whole substantive assistance inquiry is limited to, and subsumed under, the pre-trial act of pro-
secutorial discretion (including any plea bargaining made). This also obviates the need to consider what
happens if evidence provided by drug couriers turn out to be useful only much later on—such evidence is
not meant to automatically lead to a successful avoidance of the death penalty to begin with.
Implementing all of the above will necessarily require the partial repeal of s. 33B of the MDA—that
is, the part that pertains to the prosecutorial certification—but this is more consistent with the current
dynamic between the prosecution and the courts in Singapore (executive supremacy will be respected
for prosecutorial matters), and further obviates the need to address the difficult questions of what precise
standard of assistance is required and to what extent operational decisions can be challenged in court. Inso-
far as the prosecution is already justifying its wide prosecutorial powers on the basis of a robust internal
system of checks and balances and that crime control remains part of its paramount mandate, the removal
of the substantive assistance requirement may be a more pragmatic solution for all parties concerned.89
From an evidential point of view, the court’s function is appropriately streamlined as well, for it need
only consider the questions of liability and whether the accused person was indeed a courier, and the
prosecution would no doubt agree it is in the best position to weigh all the evidence and prosecutorial
factors—sensitive or otherwise—in determining the appropriate scale of culpability that ought to be
attached to the accused person in the form of the charge that is first brought.90 From a criminal justice
86. Ibid.
87. 18 US Code § 3553(e). See also § 3553(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the same.
88. Similarly, ss. 73 and 74 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 speak of general assistance given to the pro-
secutor or investigator in return for a possible reduction of sentence.
89. Given the existing legal barriers, limiting the scope of any challenge of prosecutorial discretion only helps accused persons, at
least in terms of not protracting legal proceedings.
90. Of course, this does not completely remove the danger of an innocent accused person caving into pressure and admitting to the
crime so as to hopefully avoid the death penalty, but the assumption made here is that in Singapore, prosecutions are only
internally authorised and brought when there is adequate and (for the most part) reliable evidence.
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point of view, there is greater certainty (though not necessarily more transparency at the charging
stage) and less potential twists and turns in the process, and this is important for accused persons
no matter what one might think of the importance of eliminating the scourge of drug addiction.
Indeed, it will be gravely unjust if an innocent accused person had capitulated under pressure
(whether internally or externally) to admit to being a drug courier, but yet is sentenced to death
because the prosecution did not wish to certify substantive assistance, with the latter decision being
seemingly one that will not be questioned too much in court. Yet the removal of tension between
one arm of the government and another does not always lead to positive outcomes: the supposed
restoration of judicial supremacy in the form of Parliament granting the courts the full discretion to
decide the appropriate sentence by not prescribing any statutory guidelines brings about its own set
of problems.
Lack of sentencing guidance
Even after a convicted drug trafficker is held to be a courier and the prosecutor has certified that he has
provided substantive assistance to the CNB, the court still has to decide between the death penalty and
life imprisonment as the appropriate sentence. However, s. 33B of the MDA provides absolutely no
guidelines or factors for consideration on this matter. This omission was a deliberate one by Parliament,
even though members of the judiciary, upon consultation by the ministries, had expressed the view that
the MDA should set out ‘as clearly as possible the circumstances under which the death penalty ought to
be imposed’.91 During the parliamentary debates, the Minister for Law explained that the statutory
silence was necessary to preserve the deterrent value of the MDA and the death penalty:
Consider what factors you will set out for exercise of discretion: would you say age, youth . . . young
mothers . . . impecuniosity . . . see if the trafficker was baited with love? Or would you look at other family
circumstances? You set out the criteria . . . the drug lords will send you any number who will satisfy those
criteria . . . This is because you are looking at background factors; the circumstances of the crime become
less important . . . For murder, yes. You can look at it to see if it’s a crime of passion, you can look at the
motive, you can look at the circumstances. How do you do that for drug trafficking . . . that doesn’t affect the
fundamental deterrent effect of the death penalty . . . [Moreover] Judges are reluctant to impose the ultimate
sentence [if given a choice]. And you also have the drug lords sending you the couriers who fit the criteria for
not imposing the death penalty. What is the result? De facto abolition [of the death penalty].92
It was thus a conscious decision on the part of Parliament to leave it entirely to the courts to develop
its own sentencing principles and guidelines. While some commentators have claimed that the introduc-
tion of the discretionary death penalty in Singapore is a ‘triumph for judicial sovereignty’ since the
courts now have reacquired full powers over sentencing that had been curtailed under the mandatory
death penalty regime (Mohan and Chia, 2013), being given a blank canvas means the courts will take
some time to develop a coherent set of sentencing principles—while balancing the competing need of
individualised justice in each case.93 Indeed, there have only been 10 cases thus far in which the courts
have had to consider the appropriate sentence—that is, only after the accused drug trafficker was both
confirmed as a courier and certified to have provided substantive assistance to the authorities.94 In all 10
cases, the death penalty was not imposed, suggesting that the default punishment once certification is
91. Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 November 2012 (Kasiviswanathan
Shanmugam).
92. Ibid.
93. See Public Prosecutor v UI [2008] 4 SLR(R) 500 at [19].
94. There exist a number of other re-sentencing cases such as those involving Subashkaran s/o Pragasam and Yip Mun Hei, but
because no written judgments were produced, it is actually unclear if those re-sentences were given in the specific context of s.
33B of the MDA. In the interests of space, not all ten cases will be discussed.
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given is life imprisonment.95 However, most of these cases did not provide much guidance in terms of how
the court arrived at its decision, and indeed only six of them resulted in written judgments being produced.96
The earliest of these cases was Public Prosecutor v Abdul Haleem bin Abdul Karim.97 The accused
person was a 29-year-old Singaporean who was caught purchasing almost 100 grams of diamorphine
(the amount that triggers a capital charge for this class of drugs is 15 grams) from a drug supplier for
the purposes of repacking them for sale. He was spared the death penalty mainly because the judge was
of the view that his involvement in the crime was incidental and unplanned—for the most part, he had
simply tagged along with the co-accused, who was always the one in direct contact with the supplier and
the one who planned the route of movement on the day of collection.
In Public Prosecutor v Mahesvaran a/l Sivalingam,98 the accused person was a 20-year-old Malay-
sian who was caught at an immigration checkpoint trafficking 24 grams of diamorphine. He admitted
immediately to the crime, and subsequently claimed that he was trafficking drugs because he was in
great financial difficulty after borrowing money from an illegal moneylender to pay for his brother’s
medical fees. Although there was evidence adduced in court that this was not the first time he had traf-
ficked drugs into Singapore, this was his first conviction. Beyond this, no other circumstances relevant to
sentencing were made known.
The facts were not significantly different in Public Prosecutor v Pursushothaman a/l Subrama-
niam.99 There, the accused person was a 21-year-old Malaysian who was also caught at an immigration
checkpoint trafficking diamorphine (but a much higher amount of 75 grams). Although he initially
denied knowing the exact substance he was carrying, the prosecutor successfully relied on the presump-
tion in s. 18 of the MDA in court. In choosing not to mete out the death sentence, the judge noted that the
accused person’s main motivation for committing the crime was to help pay his mother’s medical bills
and that he was a first-time offender (though, as in the case above, there was evidence adduced that he
had trafficked drugs on other occasions before).
In Public Prosecutor v V Shanmugam a/l Veloo,100 the accused person was a 30-year-old Malaysian
charged with trafficking 29 grams of diamorphine. He denied knowing that he was trafficking drugs,
claiming instead that it was the companion he was travelling with who was responsible for the crime,
while the companion raised the same defence. Both were found guilty, but the prosecutor refused to cer-
tify substantive assistance for the companion and only did so for the accused person. However, even
though s. 33B of the MDA does not stipulate that the death penalty is avoided as a matter of course the
moment the prosecutor certifies substantive assistance, the judge proceeded to sentence the accused per-
son to life imprisonment and caning, without elaborating on the reasons in his judgment.
In Public Prosecutor v Mohammed Fauziya,101 the prosecution’s case was that the first accused had
smuggled a bag containing 1.8 kg of methamphetamine from Niger to Singapore, which she transferred
to the second accused, who then tried to smuggle the bag out of Singapore. The first accused denied
knowledge of the contents of the bag, while the second accused claimed that the bag was not hers. The
95. If this is the case, then this is yet another reason to make the substantive assistance decision a pre-trial one, for to do otherwise
would just give the impression of the court rubber-stamping the prosecution’s certification decision (by not meting out the
death penalty).
96. The other two cases involved Yong Vui Kong—a young Malaysian whose case had repeatedly made international headlines
over the years because of the dramatic and protracted litigation resulting from multiple lawsuits—and Konkla Juntida, a
young Thai woman who had trafficked almost 2 kilograms of methamphetamine. As all of the three cases with written
judgments were from the High Court and may be subject to appeal, the Court of Appeal may yet elaborate on possible
guidelines in the near future if it deems fit.
97. Above n. 10.
98. Above n. 10.
99. Above n. 10. The judgment finding liability is found in Public Prosecutor v Purushothaman a/l Subramaniam [2014] SGHC
215.
100. Above n. 10.
101. Above n. 10.
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court held that the presumption of knowledge was not rebutted by both accused persons and that they
were also both not credible witnesses, but because the prosecution did not make submissions on impos-
ing the death penalty, the accused persons were both sentenced to life imprisonment.
Finally, in Public Prosecutor v Christeen d/o Jayamany,102 the accused person was charged with traf-
ficking 45 grams of diamorphine. She denied ever knowing the contents of what she was transporting,
even though she had made several deliveries in the past. Her excuse was that she was desperate for
money and she did not wish to question the person who asked her to make the deliveries as he was intro-
duced to her by her family friend, a respected person in the community. The court held that the presump-
tion of knowledge was not rebutted, but as the prosecution did not argue for the death penalty, the
accused person was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Noticeably, in at least four of these cases, the court seemed to focus on the circumstances of the offender
(the personal traits and background of the offender), rather than the circumstances of the case (such as the
type or quantity of the drugs trafficked). In all of these cases, prior judgments were not referred to either.
Given the otherwise lack of judicial explication on how the sentences were arrived at,103 might some gui-
dance perhaps be sought from the other discretionary death penalty regime inSingapore—that of the offence
ofmurder—since this regimewas introduced in the sameyear as s. 33Bof theMDA? In this regard, theCourt
of Appeal’s recent and comprehensive judgment in Public Prosecutor v Kho Jabing104 is instructive. This
was a specially constitutedCourt ofAppeal that comprised five, instead of the usual three, judges for a Court
of Appeal hearing. The court framed the unprecedented question it needed to answer as: ‘For an offence of
murder where the mandatory death penalty does not apply, in what circumstances would the death penalty
still bewarranted?’105 The accused person in that case had been re-sentenced to life imprisonment after com-
mitting an extremely vicious murder, and the Court of Appeal noted that in answering the seemingly simple
question presented, it had to navigate ‘a great deal of difficulties and complications’.106
After surveying the relevant parliamentary debates as well as local and foreign case law, the court drew
the following conclusions: first, the general sentencing factors of the seriousness of the offence, the fre-
quency and prevalence of the offence, and the need for deterrence do not assume especial credence in the
context of murder, even though they are clearly relevant; secondly, the ‘rarest of rare’ principle should not
be followed, as the more appropriate principle is whether the actions of the offender would outrage the
feelings of the community; thirdly, the court must consider whether the offender had acted in a way that
exhibited a blatant disregard for human life; and finally, the motive, intention, age and intelligence are also
likely to be relevant factors.107 However, as noted earlier, the Minister for Law had already forewarned
during the parliamentary debates that the sentencing factors used in murder could not be easily transposed
to the present context, as murder and drug trafficking are very different in nature and motivation, and there
is strictly speaking no victim or victims established yet in a drug trafficking charge. This is made even
clearer when the sentencing factors set out in Kho Jabing are considered; the closest one may come to
extracting a transposable principle is whether a drug courier had acted in a way so egregious that a death
penalty is warranted—for instance, if he is a repeat offender, or if the quantity of drugs trafficked was
extraordinarily large (such that it has a significant ‘community impact’) (Henham, 2014: 108). But does
this necessarily mean that sentencing guidelines should be established, whether statutorily or otherwise?
As mentioned, the Minister for Law had explained during the parliamentary debates that the purpose
for not establishing any sentencing guidelines in the MDA is to preserve the deterrent value of the MDA.
102. Above n. 10.
103. See also Thong Ah Fat v Public Prosecutor [2012] 1 SLR 676 at [15]: ‘It is now settled law that a judge must ordinarily give
adequate reasons for any decision made, subject to any peculiar circumstance that may prevail. This is not only the case
where the decision is on a matter involving questions of law’.
104. Above n. 4.
105. Ibid. at [8].
106. Ibid. at [9].
107. Ibid. at [12] and [51].
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Militating against this is the general tendency of judges not to mete out the death penalty unless they are
presented with an extremely clear case that warrants the death penalty108—in other words, the absence of
clear guiding factors will eventually lead to a de facto abolition of the death penalty for drug trafficking,
which will surely not be considered consistent with the goal of preserving the deterrent value of the
MDA and the death penalty.109 Indeed, we have already seen from the cases above that where substan-
tive assistance has been certified, the courts have not gone ahead to impose the death penalty (nor are any
substantial reasons given). At the same time, the fact that a charge can be amended at any point of the
proceedings will also contribute to the de facto abolition of the death penalty. This may be done by the
prosecution as part of its prosecutorial powers (See also Pao-Keerthi, 2014: 529), or even by the court.
For instance, in Public Prosecutor vMuhammad Farid bin Mohd Yusop,110 at the conclusion of the trial,
the High Court judge amended the charge from a potential death penalty one to a non-death penalty one,
on the basis that there was not enough evidence as to whether the accused person knew he was trafficking
more than 250 grams of methamphetamine. Accordingly, the only sentencing consistency that will
emerge from s. 33B is a default avoidance of the death, but the only way to restore the deterrent value
of the MDA and the death penalty is the reversion to the mandatory death penalty regime.
To put matters in proper perspective, however, the Singapore courts have yet to be given ample time to
develop a cogent set of sentencing principles for s. 33B of the MDA, but in what little has been seen thus
far, the gradual trend of de facto abolition is unlikely to reverse direction. A couple of other points in this
regard should also be noted. First, the Court of Appeal has recently clarified in Public Prosecutor v Lim
Yong Soon Bernard that Criminal References should not be filed for the purposes of seeking clarification
on appropriate sentences to be imposed; according to the court, ‘sentencing is necessarily a fact-sensitive
inquiry and this would not ordinarily give rise to a question of public interest’.111 What would otherwise
have been an expedient way for the apex court to at least articulate some general principles for s. 33B is
now foreclosed, and this is exacerbated by the fact that s. 33B appears to be a unique legislative provision
that finds no direct counterpart in other jurisdictions and so no meaningful comparative exercise can be
undertaken. Secondly, Singapore is not a jurisdiction that has the benefit of the guidance of a fully-
fledged sentencing council.112 This may be contrasted with jurisdictions such as the UK, where the Sen-
tencing Council for England andWales has recommended a comprehensive eight-step analytical process in
determining the appropriate sentence for drug offences, including illegal drug importation.113 There is no
compelling reason why a similar approach cannot be adopted, but without such a sentencing body,114 the
ball is entirely in the court of the Singapore courts to create internally consistent guidelines. Indeed, it
is even possible that other evidential complications may arise at the sentencing stage as was seen in the
murder context; in Kho Jabing, the majority in the Court of Appeal refuted the minority’s judgment on
108. See Second Reading of Misuse of Drugs (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliament Reports, 14 November 2012 (Kasi-
viswanathan Shanmugam). In a sense, this is an application of the proportionality principle, which appears to be the
overarching principle for common law jurisdictions that do not have recourse to (non-judicial) sentencing guidelines:
O’Malley (2013).
109. Taiwan, which introduced the discretionary death penalty slightly more than a decade ago, has seen its courts mete out the
death penalty in less than 10 per cent of cases that involved offences punishable by death: Wang (2011: 170–172).
110. Above n. 10.
111. [2015] SGCA 19 at [31].
112. Ad hoc committees looking into sentencing benchmarks for particular crimes are formed from time to time, but such
committees are also not independent bodies but simply comprise existing members of the judiciary.
113. Sentencing Council, Drug Offences Definitive Guide (2012). There, it is recommended that the court should first consider the
role of the offender and the quantity and type of drugs concerned. The court would then consider, inter alia, relevant
aggravating and mitigating factors. See also Ashworth (2006a: 18): ‘If the influence of guidelines is to be researched this will
require the ‘‘shadowing’’ of judges and a judicial willingness to talk through their reasoning processes in actual cases.
Without that, the effectiveness of the English guideline system will remain a matter of belief based on inferences’.
114. See also Hooper (2015: 30): ‘Whilst sentencing is not and probably never will be a science [as opposed to an art] . . . the
application (with reasons) of broad guidelines issued by a sentencing council or similar body do much to make sentencing a
fairer, consistent and more scientific process’.
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the basis that the latter had essentially made new findings of fact when determining the egregiousness
of conduct.115 A similar problem may arise in the drug trafficking context, especially if the guiding
principle in sentencing is also the egregiousness of conduct—evidence on this may not have been
adduced during the trial, and Newton hearings may be necessitated. On the other hand, if the senten-
cing principle, as evinced by the case law thus far, is based on the circumstances of the offender, then
this clearly goes against Parliament’s intention of weakening the deterrent value of the MDA.
All in all, taking the path of the slow and incremental development of sentencing principles by the
courts will probably only be to the detriment of accused drug couriers, whose counsel may attempt to
protract litigation as much as possible (such as filing appeals, constitutional challenges, criminal
motions, and clemency pleas) just to get their clients off the gallows, or at least for as long as possi-
ble—an ironic outcome brought about only because mandatory death has now become discretionary
death. If this materialises, this is only going to have a negative impact on persons charged with capital
drug trafficking offences and awaiting their sentencing fates.
Conclusion
When the discretionary death penalty was introduced for the MDA, it was a move largely welcomed by
many members of the criminal justice community in Singapore—the assumption was that low-level
operatives of drug syndicates, being generally less ‘deserving’ of the death penalty, could now have their
punishments decided by the court on a case-by-case basis. This article makes no claim of the appropri-
ateness of the death penalty or the degree of moral culpability of drug couriers. Instead, it highlights four
main challenges brought about by the amended legislation, some of which had actually been pre-
emptively identified during the parliamentary debates, but the decision made in Parliament then was
to adopt a wait-and-see approach. Unfortunately, subsequent judicial developments have either been
slow or unrelated to particular nuances of those challenges.
The challenge pertaining to the privilege against self-incrimination remains unresolved when one
considers the possibility of innocent accused persons—already under the pressure of the presumptions
of the MDA, adverse inferences of the CPC, and possible lack of legal representation at a critical stage of
proceedings—taking a calculated gamble of avoiding the death penalty by admitting to guilt at as early a
stage as possible. The challenge pertaining to a change of defence during the sentencing stage also
remains unresolved, given that even a Newton hearing will not help an innocent accused person conjure
up evidence that simply did not exist, whether for the purposes of proving that he was only a courier or
otherwise. The substantive assistance dilemma is but part of a larger issue of the appropriate limits of
prosecutorial discretion, though the lesser evil may well lie in making the substantive assistance deter-
mination by the prosecution a pre-trial one and not a matter to be considered only at sentencing. Finally,
the current lack of sentencing guidelines both in the MDA and in the case law produces no obvious ben-
efit, and is more likely to result in judges avoiding meting out the death sentence and the prosecution
avoiding pressing death penalty charges unless the facts of the case are exceptional on some level—but
either eventuality contradicts Parliament’s express aim of preserving the deterrent value of the MDA and
the death penalty via the 2012 amendments.116
115. Kho Jabing, above n. 4 at [201].
116. Just as the proof of this article was being finalised, the Court of Appeal released its grounds of decision in Muhammad
Ridzuan bin Mohd Ali v Attorney-General [2015] SGCA 53. This was an appeal from the judicial review decision rendered
by the High Court. The court held as follows: first, when challenging the prosecution’s decision not to grant a certificate of
substantive assistance, the accused person must establish a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion; secondly, an accused
person’s good faith cooperation with the authorities is neither a necessary nor sufficient basis for the prosecution to grant the
certificate; thirdly, a judge is not the appropriate person to determine the question of whether substantive assistance has been
rendered; and finally, what connotes ‘bad faith’ within the meaning of s. 33B of the MDA is dishonesty, or the knowing use
of a discretionary power for extraneous purposes.
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